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Executive Summary
There are four normative models of the corporation: Contractarianism, Shareholder
Primacy, Stakeholder Theory, and the Team Production Model. The model of corporate
law that one espouses has a tremendous impact on the debate over the optimal mix of
mandatory and default rules and the relative importance that one attaches to the five
hallmarks of good corporate law.
Legal rules in corporate law can take one of three forms: mandatory rules that corporate
actors must comply with and cannot be opted out of; enabling rules that provide legal
force to the rules or agreements that are adopted or reached by corporate actors; and
default rules that provide standard-form rules that govern the relationships of corporate
actors unless they (expressly or impliedly) opt out of them and adopt their own rules.
The five main policy goals and objectives of good corporate law are:






enhancing economic efficiency;
ensuring accountability of corporate managers, directors and officers;
protecting shareholders and other vulnerable parties;
attracting business to the jurisdiction by inspiring confidence, supporting
competitiveness, innovation and growth; and
responding effectively to the needs of larger widely-held and smaller closely-held
businesses.

An evaluation of the CBCA reveals that it is effective in meeting and balancing these five
policy goals and objectives. The most recent round of amendments to the CBCA
contained in Bill S-11 were instrumental in furthering the goals of protecting
shareholders, inspiring confidence, innovation and growth, and responding to the needs
of smaller closely-held businesses.
There remains further room for improvement, however.


In the context of enhancing economic efficiency, the government’s stated goal of
minimizing duplication with provincial securities regulation should be revisited.
A more logical goal for the CBCA should be to determine which aspects of
business law regulation are most appropriately contained in a corporate law
statute and which aspects are better suited to be left to securities regulators.



In the context of ensuring accountability of corporate managers, a sub-goal of this
policy objective is to clearly articulate the responsibilities and duties of those we
wish to hold accountable. As such, directors’ duties in the context of take-over
bids should be codified into the CBCA, the regulations or policy directives issued
by the Director.



In the context of protecting shareholders and other vulnerable parties, it should be
made clear that the oppression remedy cannot be used to pursue claims that are
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derivative in nature. In addition, in respect of non-shareholders, additional
guidance should be provided on who is a proper person to be a complainant to
seek relief under the oppression remedy.


In the context of being responsive to the needs of small closely-held corporations,
the definition of unanimous shareholders agreement should be broadened so that
it recognizes shareholders agreements that do not transfer board duties to the
shareholders.
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1. Introduction
The objectives of this research are three fold. First, this research study sets out the policy
objectives and criteria for good corporate law. Second, this research study assesses
whether the CBCA1 meets those policy objectives and criteria. Third, the report makes
preliminary recommendations for reform to the CBCA, which may be subject to further
research studies.
This research study will assist in the development of a modern and effective corporate
law framework that enhances economic efficiency, ensures accountability of corporate
managers, directors and officers, affords shareholders and other vulnerable parties
sufficient protection, inspires confidence, supports competitiveness, innovation and
growth, and is responsive to the needs of both small, closely-held businesses and large,
publicly-held corporations.
Part 2 frames the relevant research questions within four competing theoretical models of
the corporation, and sets out the five policy goals and objectives of good corporate law.
Part 2 also reviews and analyses academic literature on the optimal role of mandatory and
default rules in corporate law. This part also identifies three main types of corporations
that are present in the Canadian economy: (i) private, closely-held corporations; (ii) large,
publicly-held corporations; and (iii) large, public corporations with a controlling (family
or foreign) shareholder. This theoretical and policy categorization is relevant to the
analysis and assessment of the CBCA conducted in the report.
Finally, Part 3 evaluates and assesses the effectiveness of the CBCA against the
theoretical frameworks developed in Part 2. This part assesses whether or not the CBCA
strikes an optimal balance between the five hallmarks of good corporate law, and whether
or not the CBCA consists of an appropriate balance of mandatory and default rules. In so
doing, this part also assesses whether or not the CBCA meets the needs of the three
corporation types identified in Part 2, in particular, the needs of small, closely-held
corporations. Based on the entire analysis, this part makes preliminary recommendations
for reform to the CBCA and provides directions for further study and research.

1

R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44. [“CBCA”].
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2. Theoretical Frameworks
A. Normative Models of the Corporation
This part sets out four normative models of the corporation. The theories underlying
each model are analyzed and their underlying assumptions are revealed. The model that
one espouses has a tremendous impact on the relative importance that is attached to each
of the six policy goals and objects of good corporate law and on the debate over
mandatory versus enabling rules.
(i) Contractarianism
Contractarianism is a theory of corporate law based on the notion that the corporation is a
“nexus of contracts.”2 Under this model, the corporation is not a separate legal entity, but
a representation of express and implied contractual relationships and obligations among
stakeholders, all of whom provide various inputs that are important to the productive
process. For example, shareholders provide equity capital, employees provide labour and
debt capital, the board of directors provides monitoring services, senior management
provides services to operate the business and oversee more junior management, and so
forth. Under this model, for example, limited liability for shareholders represents the
bargain shareholders have struck with creditors. Similarly, employees have agreed to be
compensated in the form of wages. Acceptance of the contractarianism theory of
corporate law has implications for the debate on the optimal mix of mandatory and
default rules in corporate law. This model supports the position that corporate law is and
ought to be comprised of default provisions to which private parties would themselves
have agreed, had they engaged in private bargaining. This model sees little or no scope
for mandatory rules of corporate law. Under this model, the government’s role is to
provide default rules that the parties would have agreed to themselves and to enforce
private contracts.
(ii) Shareholder Primacy
The shareholder primacy model of corporate law espouses the view that shareholders
own the corporation and that in discharging their duty “to act in the best interests of the
corporation”, directors and officers ought to act in the interests of shareholders and
engage in profit maximization. The shareholder primacy theory takes the view that
corporate law does not have a role to play in protecting the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders such as creditors, employees or the local community. The view behind this
model is that the interests of these stakeholders can be sufficiently protected through
private bargaining and contract law and other areas of regulation such as employment
law, health and safety legislation, bankruptcy law, and environmental law.

2

Easterbrook and Fishel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1991).
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(iii) Stakeholder Theory
The stakeholder model of corporate law is based on the premise that stakeholders other
than shareholders have legitimate interests in the corporation. Under this model, the
corporation’s role and purpose are broader then profit maximization for the exclusive
benefit of shareholders. Instead, this theory advocates that the interests of all
stakeholders ought to be given due consideration in corporate decision-making,
especially given the resources that all such stakeholders have invested in the corporation
and the risks associated with their investment.
(iv) Team Production Model of Corporate Law
This model of corporate law is an offshoot of the stakeholder theory. The proponents of
this theory argue that legal rules in public widely-held corporations must address the
team production problem in which individuals must invest firm-specific resources to
produce a non-separable product.3 In such instances, individuals will have difficulty
negotiating and drafting express individual contracts to distribute the fruits of their joint
product. As a result, they give up control to the board of directors, which is responsible
for representing the team and rewarding its members. The team is comprised of
shareholders, all levels of employees, creditors, customers, and the community. Under
this model, the goal of corporate law is not the maximization of shareholder profit, but
rather, maximization of the overall joint welfare of all team members, a responsibility
that is left for the directors to discharge.
(v) Reflections of the Normative Models in the CBCA
The CBCA is not the exclusive product of any one of the above-discussed normative
models. While the CBCA generally reflects a shareholder primacy model, there are
particular provisions in the Act that suggest some acknowledgement of the interests of
non-shareholder stakeholders. For instance, the definition of “complainant” is broad
enough to suggest that the respective provisions in the Act encompass potential claims by
non-shareholder stakeholders that have been harmed by corporate decision-making. Also,
there are particular provisions in the Act, such as section 42, which protects creditors by
imposing a solvency test prior to the declaration or payment of dividends, and section
119, which protects employees by imposing personal liability on directors for six months
of back wages, which also acknowledge and protect the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders. However, unlike in many U.S. state corporate law codes that contain
“stakeholder statutes”, there is currently no general provision in the CBCA that explicitly
permits directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in corporate
decision-making.
Mirroring the general theoretical bent of the CBCA, the Canadian judiciary has also
endorsed the shareholder primacy model of corporate law. There are two pockets of
corporate law where courts have been more responsive to the idea of corporate law
3

Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law” (1999) 85:2 Va L.
Rev. 248.
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considering the interests of stakeholders. In the context of defining directors’ duties in
the face of a hostile takeover bid, the British Columbia Supreme Court stated in Teck v.
Millar4 that the directors may have “reasonable regard” for the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders in defending the company against a hostile takeover bid. More
recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in Maple Leaf Foods v. Schneider Corp. et
al5 that a target company’s directors may consider a hostile takeover bidder’s historically
poor relations with its employees and the effect that a successful bid would have on the
target company’s employees.

4
5

[1973] 2 W.W.R. 385, 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288
(1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (C.A.)
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B. The Appropriate Role of Mandatory versus Default Rules
Legal rules in corporate law can take one of three forms: mandatory rules that corporate
actors must comply with and cannot be opted out of; enabling rules that provide legal
force to the rules or agreements that are adopted or reached by corporate actors; and
default rules that provide standard-form rules that govern the relationships of corporate
actors unless they (expressly or impliedly) opt out of them and adopt their own rules.
This section analyzes the optimal mix of the different forms of legal rules in corporate
law. One’s view on the optimal mix will be influenced by the normative model of
corporate law that one espouses, the relative weight that one attaches to the six hallmarks
of corporate law, the particular type of corporation at issue (closely-held, public and
widely-held, or controlled), and the substantive matter that any particular corporate rule
deals with.
There are several arguments in favour of the position that corporate law ought to be
comprised entirely or largely of default rules as opposed to mandatory rules. The first is
the contractarian view that that optimal corporate law is premised on the notion of
freedom of contract, and that the state should not interfere with the process of equal
parties freely entering into private economic relations with equal information. In addition,
the circumstances under which corporations operate are too diverse and too varied to
create a single set of mandatory rules. Default rules afford companies greater flexibility
in tailoring rules to meet their particular conditions or circumstances if those provided in
the corporate code are not suitable.
There are several opposing arguments that mandatory legal rules ought to be an important
core component of a corporate law statute.6 First, failures in the market necessitate
mandatory legal intervention to achieve economic efficiency. The fact is that some
mandatory rules are efficient. Second, enhancing economic efficiency is one of six
hallmarks of good corporate law and it must be balanced against competing objectives.
The introduction of mandatory rules is necessary, for example, to protect vulnerable
parties. Third, corporate actors do not always neatly fit into the freedom of contract
paradigm of equal bargaining power and equal information such that the law may have to
impose mandatory rules on parties in some instances.
The appropriate mix of default and mandatory rules depends in part on the particular type
of corporation in question. In the public, widely-held corporation, rules that deal with
matters where there may be an inherent conflict between the interests of managers and
shareholders ought to be mandatory. In particular, rules that specify managers’ duties
should be mandatory, such as the duty of directors and officers to act in the best interests
of the corporation. This duty should not be a default rule that managers can opt out of so
that they can effectively act in their self-interest. Similarly, rules on related party

6

M. Eisenberg, “The Structure of Corporation Law” (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461.
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transactions, whether they take the form of prohibition, disclosure, abstinence from
voting, or independent valuations, also should be mandatory.
Shareholder remedies and shareholder rights to information about the company and
communication with each other also should be mandatory. The shareholder right to
appoint an auditor to review financial disclosure and the shareholder right to approve
fundamental changes should also be mandatory. Rules that fundamentally affect third
parties such as creditors and employees also should be mandatory.
In matters where the managers’ self-interest is not inherently pitted against that of
shareholders, such as instances where the rights of shareholders as amongst themselves
are being determined, default rules that can be opted out of are more appropriate. For
example, rules governing the rights attached to shares should be default. Specifically,
these rights include the right to dividends, the right to vote, and the right to receive assets
upon dissolution or winding up of the corporation, and the default rule that all shares
have equal rights unless divided up into different classes or series is appropriate. Preemptive rights should also be a default rule.
Similarly, procedural rules about director or shareholder meetings should create some
level of minimum standards, but should leave room for corporate actors to modify those
standards. Basic elements of corporate governance, such as the number of directors on
the board, the proportion of directors that are independent of management, and the
qualifications of directors, should also be governed by minimum threshold rules.
In large, publicly-held corporations, the key issue is the accountability of controlling
shareholders (as opposed to accountability of management) to public shareholders. The
same break up of mandatory and default rules applies, with the addition that fiduciary
duties that the controlling shareholder owes to public shareholders should be mandatory.
In private, closely-held corporations there ought to be more room for default rules that
allow corporate actors to opt out of the provisions of the Act. This suggestion recognizes
that some corporate law rules may be cost-prohibitive while not furthering the goals of
corporate law. Also, there are unique circumstances in closely-held corporations that
cannot be sufficiently accounted for in a single corporate law statute. Nonetheless, there
is a core set of rules that should remain mandatory even in the context of closely-held
corporations. This core set of rules includes fiduciary duties, shareholder remedies, and
shareholder rights to information. In respect of fiduciary duties, parties should be
allowed to carve-out specifically fine exceptions to the general fiduciary duty. In respect
of shareholder remedies, parties should not be allowed to agree to a wholesale opting out
of a derivative suit or oppression action. However, parties should be able to define their
reasonable expectations at the outset of their relationship, which may have an impact on
any future litigation claims.
In terms of matters for which default rules are more appropriate than mandatory rules, the
issue that follows is how should policy makers and regulators choose as between two or
more options in respect of the default rule? The contractarian view is that the default rule
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should minimize transaction costs and approximate what the parties would have agreed
to. Other scholars argue that given the choice of two or more potential default rules,
regulators should adopt the rule that is less favourable to managers so that managers must
actively opt out of the default rule.7
As a general matter, corporate law statutes do not expressly state whether a provision in a
corporate law statute is mandatory, enabling or default. This task is left to the good faith
of and interpretation by the contracting parties and the judiciary. Also, in the case of
default rules, corporate law statutes generally do not provide whether or not the opting
out must be express (oral or written) or implied by a course of dealing. This matter is left
to judges to determine depending on the facts of any particular case. While it can be
posited that the more central the right being opted out of (i.e. the oppression action or
rights to information about the corporation), the more likely that courts will find that the
opting out must be express and in writing. However, it would be worthwhile to
categorize, for the benefit of corporate law statute users, which provisions are mandatory
and which are default.

7 Lucian A. Bebchuk, and Assaf Hamdani, “Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution”, (2002) 96:2
Northwestern University Law Review 489.
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C. Policy Goals and Objectives of Corporate Law
This section sets out the five policy goals and objectives of corporate law. It is important
to note that these policy goals often overlap and conflict with each other, and the relative
importance or value placed on each policy goal depends on several factors. The theory of
corporate law one espouses will impact the assessment of the weight that ought to be
accorded to various policy goals, and the particular aspect of corporate law that is at issue
will also affect how the policy goals are balanced.
The five main policy goals and objectives of good corporate law are:
 enhancing economic efficiency;
 ensuring accountability of corporate managers, directors and officers;
 protecting shareholders and other vulnerable parties;
 responding effectively to the needs of larger widely-held and smaller closely-held
businesses; and
 attracting business to the jurisdiction by inspiring confidence, supporting
competitiveness, innovation and growth.
There are some secondary policy goals worth noting, including improvement of the
efficient administration of the statutory framework, and fostering corporate social
responsibility which drive, or at the very least, add another rational for, several of the five
primary policy goals.
While this report discusses the interaction between a corporate law statute and the
judiciary’s role in applying and enforcing the statute, it should be noted that this study
focuses primarily on good corporate law from the vantage point of the statutory
framework. Consequently, the role of the courts is not analyzed in significant depth.
(i) Enhance Economic Efficiency
A primary goal of corporate law is to enhance economic efficiency. Economic efficiency
is comprised of allocative efficiency and transactional efficiency. Allocative efficiency
can refer to Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto efficiency. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency involves a
change where those who gain can fully compensate those who lose. Pareto efficiency
refers to a state in which one person cannot be made better off without someone else
being made worse-off. Transactional efficiency attempts to minimize the transaction
costs of entering into productive relationships and arrangements.
In free market economies, corporate law plays an important role in facilitating commerce
and maximizing both allocative and transactional efficiency. In respect of allocative
efficiency, corporate law (together with securities laws) assists in ensuring that assets are
being most productively used and that asset prices reflect their intrinsic value. Good
corporate law encourages capital formation and efficient allocation of capital resources.
In respect of transactional efficiency, an effective corporate law framework minimizes
the transaction costs associated with using the corporate form. A good corporate law
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framework provides default or off-the-rack rules that corporate actors such as
shareholders, managers and directors can utilize with ease. These default rules represent
the best of what these parties would have agreed to if they had put their minds to the
matter, and specifically, the terms of their relationship. In this way, good corporate law
helps minimize the organizational costs of doing business.
A good corporate law statute provides default rules on matters that are of central
importance to corporate actors including the duties and responsibilities of managers,
directors and officers, the division of profits, the rights of shareholders, and so forth. A
good corporate law statute is convenient and accessible. It can save corporate actors
significant savings in time, effort and professional fees, instead allowing corporate actors
to channel their resources to productive activity. Even if corporate actors decide to vary
the default provisions available to them in a corporate law code, these default rules
nonetheless provide a strong frame of reference from which to make modifications,
which can also represent significant savings.
A good corporate law statute also reduces the costs of capital for businesses organized
under the corporate form by ensuring that mandatory corporate law requirements are not
unduly burdensome and do not add significantly to expenses. Simply put, good corporate
law ensures that any mandatory regulation is cost-justified.
A good corporate law framework also allows management to manage the business and
make ordinary business decisions in an efficient, time-responsive manner that is not
unduly constrained by requirements to obtain shareholder approval. There is of course a
delicate balance to be struck between efficient operation of business and shareholder
protection.
(ii) Ensure Accountability of Corporate Managers and Directors
Ensuring accountability of corporate managers and directors is a critical purpose of
corporate law. The specifics of this function depend on the type of corporation at issue,
and each corporation type faces a different set of accountability issues. In type (i) public
widely-held corporations, the key issue is accountability of professional managers to
public retail shareholders. In contrast, the key issue in type (ii) public corporations with a
controlling shareholder is accountability of the controlling shareholders to public retail
shareholders. Finally, the key issue in type (iii) closely-held corporations is
accountability of the shareholders (who also generally manage the corporation) to each
other.
In type (i) public widely-held corporations, a good corporate law statute ensures that:



management has a legal fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation;
shareholders have the right to elect their representatives to
oversee the business and affairs of the corporation;

12

Hallmarks of Good Corporate Law
Professor Poonam Puri




shareholders have rights of access to information about
corporate activity; and
shareholders have access to cost-effective remedies if they are
aggrieved by management.

In type (ii) publicly controlled corporations, a good corporate law statute also ensures that
controlling shareholders’ duties to the public/minority shareholders are clearly
articulated. A good corporate law creates sufficient safeguards to ensure that the
controlling shareholder is accountable and acts in good faith and in the best interests of
the corporation, which includes the interests of those non-controlling, public
shareholders. Historically, corporate law statutes have not expressly stated whether a
controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to public or minority shareholders.
Consequently, the judiciary has generally been charged with defining the duties that
controlling shareholders owe to minority and/or public shareholders.
In type (iii) corporations, the owners generally manage the corporation, there is no
separation between ownership and control, and hence there is no issue of accountability
of management. A good corporate law statute ensures that controlling shareholders are
accountable to the non-controlling shareholders and that there are mechanisms to ensure
that the reasonable expectations of all shareholders are recognized.
(iii) Protect Shareholders and Other Vulnerable Parties
A good corporate law statute protects vulnerable parties. One’s definition of vulnerable
parties is intricately linked to the normative model of corporate law that one espouses.
Under the shareholder primacy and contractarian models, vulnerable parties are minority
and/or public shareholders. Under the stakeholder and team production models of
corporate law, vulnerable parties would include stakeholders such as employees,
customers, creditors, the community, and the environment, in addition to shareholders.
The goal of protecting vulnerable parties requires, by definition, certain rules that are
mandatory and cannot be opted out of.
(iv) Respond to the Needs of Large Widely-Held and
Small Closely-Held Businesses
Given that a large part of the Canada’s economy is comprised of micro, small and
medium sized businesses, a good corporate law statute must be responsive to their needs.
To the extent that a jurisdiction does not have separate statutory frameworks for larger
and smaller businesses, the single statutory framework must afford sufficient flexibility to
allow smaller businesses to opt out of rules that are not suitable for their particular
circumstances. It must also ensure mandatory rules actually further the policy goals of
good corporate law and are not cost-prohibitive for smaller businesses.
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(v) Attract Business to the Jurisdiction by Inspiring Confidence
and Support Competitiveness, Innovation and Growth
While one might think that it is difficult, in a mature and free market economy, for a
corporate law statute to actively attract business to a jurisdiction, a good corporate law
statute should not create unnecessary obstacles for businesses to operate in that
jurisdiction. In the U.S., for instance, Delaware attracts corporate law incorporation
business on the basis that it provides flexible enabling rules that are extremely responsive
to the needs of corporate managers and shareholders and a specialized judiciary that has
expertise to adjudicate corporate law matters. A good corporate law statute should
inspire confidence, support competitiveness, innovation and growth, by allowing for
certainty, predictability, and ease of access.

(vi) Overlap and Conflicts Between Policy Goals
The five hallmarks of corporate law discussed above overlap and conflict with each other.
For example, protection of shareholders overlaps significantly with ensuring
accountability of corporate managers. Supporting competitiveness, innovation and
growth overlaps with enhancing economic efficiency and being responsive to the needs
of smaller businesses. Enhancing economic efficiency often conflicts with protecting
shareholders and ensuring accountability of corporate managers.
The five policy goals operate within the general premise of a free market economy that
the government should create the necessary infrastructure for the effective operation of
the marketplace and subsequently let businesses operate without interference from
government. On the basis of this premise, corporate statutes have been self-enforcing
and the state has taken a very hands-off approach. This approach has been reflected
historically in the passive role of corporate law regulators and heavy reliance on private
enforcement by aggrieved parties (cf. securities law statutes and active regulators). The
judicial inclination to defer to the business judgment of management is also a reflection
of this policy. The general premise of governmental non-interference is intricately linked
to and overlaps with goal of economic efficiency and often conflicts with the goals of
shareholder protection and accountability of management.
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3. An Evaluation of the CBCA
Using the hallmarks of good corporate law set out in Part 2 of this study, this part
analyses whether the CBCA meets and appropriately balances these competing policy
goals and objectives. This part also analyses whether the CBCA contains the optimal mix
of mandatory and default rules and addresses the needs of the three corporation types that
are most prevalent in the Canadian economy.
A. Enhancing Economic Efficiency
The CBCA’s primary goal is to enhance economic efficiency, and most provisions of the
CBCA can be justified on the basis of achieving allocative and transactional cost
efficiency.
For example, the default rule of limited liability for shareholders enhances allocative
efficiency by encouraging efficient capital formation and efficiently shifting risk to
parties who can best bear it.8 There are, however, some important critiques that the
appropriate default rule should be unlimited liability in relation to certain types of
creditors, and it is certainly appropriate to question whether the statute should be
amended accordingly, or whether the matter of piercing the corporate veil ought to be left
to judicial determination.
There are also many examples of the CBCA increasing transaction cost efficiency. In
respect of reducing the costs of doing business, the CBCA provisions that allow for
shareholders to appoint proxies and for shareholders to unanimously sign resolutions in
lieu of meetings are two of many examples of attempts to minimize transaction costs.
Recent amendments to the CBCA which allow for electronic participation by
shareholders at shareholders meetings and which permit corporate and accounting records
to be kept outside of Canada so long as they are accessible electronically and the
corporation provides reasonable assistance to parties wishing to access the records also
enhance transaction cost efficiency.
A key manner in which a corporate law statute enhances economic efficiency is, as noted
above, by providing default provisions that parties themselves would have entered into.
Given that almost all of the provisions in the CBCA would be justified on the basis of
economic efficiency or the balancing of economic efficiency with other goals, the issue
of whether particular rules should be mandatory or default is discussed in the sections
that follow.9
8

Easterbrook &Fishel, supra note 2.

9

In addition to engaging in a critical analysis of key provision in the CBCA based on the theoretical
frameworks set out in the preceding part of the study, it would also be extremely worthwhile to interview
stakeholders – corporate managers of large, medium sized and small companies as well as their legal
advisors – about the extent to which different types of corporations and their actors find it necessary to vary
the rules in the CBCA to meet their particular circumstances. The greater the extent to which corporations
do not vary the rules, the stronger the evidence that the CBCA plays a strong facilitative role in providing
the optimal boilerplate contracts.
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Minimizing Duplication with Provincial Securities Laws
A stated goal of Bill S-11 was that of “eliminating duplication, in part by eliminating
duplication with provincial securities laws, and reducing costs for business.” 10 This was
the explicit policy rationale behind the repeal of the CBCA’s takeover bid provisions in
Bill S-11.11
This goal can reasonably be viewed as one method of realizing the policy objective of
enhancing economic efficiency by reducing the transaction costs associated with carrying
on business in Canada. The rationale is that a corporation should not be subject to
multiple and/or conflicting rules from two or more regulatory frameworks. 12
The goal of eliminating duplication with securities laws has long-since been an explicitly
stated government goal, and was supported by the Dickerson Report, which stated:13
There has been far too much attention paid in the past to the
supposed differences between corporation legislation and securities
legislation. We do not believe that there is a valid distinction, and
that a good deal of what is found in provincial securities legislation
could just as validly be enacted as corporation legislation.
The Dickerson Committee’s comments raise an important issue about the rational
allocation of responsibility between corporate and securities law in Canada. As a
response to the crisis of confidence faced by North American capital markets and
following the U.S. Congress enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Canadian
provincial securities regulators have recently expanded the scope of their authority,
particularly in the area of corporate governance.14 For example, the Ontario Securities
Commission was recently granted rule-making authority on audit committees, CEO/CFO

10

Parliamentary Research Branch, Bill S-11: An Act to Amend the Canadian Business Corporations Act
and the Canada Cooperatives Act and to Amend other Acts (Legislative Summary) Gérald Lafrenière &
Margaret Smith (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2001) at 1.
11

Ibid.
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It should be noted that the proportionate liability scheme now contained in the CBCA is quite different in
form and structure than the proportionate liability scheme contained in the Securities Act (Ontario) in
respect of civil liability for continuous disclosure violations. See Poonam Puri & Stephanie Ben-Ishai,
Proportionate Liability under the CBCA in the Context of Recent Corporate Governance Reform:
Canadian Auditors in the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time? (2003) 39 C.B.L.J. 36
13

Information Canada, Proposal for a New Business Corporations Law For Canada, Robert W.V.
Dickerson et al. (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at 5 [“Dickerson Report”].
14

See, Poonam Puri & Leslie McCallum, Canadian Companies Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Toronto:
Butterworths, forthcoming December 2003).
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certifications of financial disclosure and establishing internal controls and procedures.15
As a practical matter, if securities regulators are constantly expanding the scope of their
authority, the CBCA will constantly be narrowing its scope of authority in order to meet
its stated goal of avoiding duplication. The more logical goal for the CBCA should be to
determine which aspects of business law regulation are most appropriately contained in a
corporate law statute and which aspects are better suited to be left to securities regulators.
This matter raises a more general issue about harmonization as between federal and
provincial corporate law regulators, and coordination with provincial securities
regulators. The issue of what matters are most appropriately the domain of corporate law
and what are those that are best left in the hands of provincial regulators should be
analysed further. This analysis will be affected by the distinct historic Canadian
evolution of corporate and securities laws. Given the increasingly global nature of
business activity, and the importance of corporate law regulatory framework in ensuring
competition and innovation and growth of the Canadian economy, a strong argument can
be made that the CBCA, as opposed to securities law statutes, ought to be the primary
regulatory authority on certain matters such as corporate governance.
B. Ensuring Accountability of Corporate Managers and Directors
While the Dickerson Report recognized that there is no practical way that shareholders of
public corporations could be involved in corporate administration, 16 the report does
provide that, “this is not to say, however, that directors should not be responsible for their
actions and accountable to shareholders and others for what the do. We believe that they
should be, and more so than they have been in the past.”17
The CBCA ensures accountability of management through several means: by imposing a
fiduciary duty on them to act in the best interests of the corporation, by imposing
personal liability on them in certain circumstances, and by allowing shareholders and
other aggrieved parties to access certain remedies.
Bill S-11’s background reports made no explicit mention of ensuring corporate
accountability but spoke more narrowly to “clarifying responsibility” 18 as one of its main
policy goals. One of the ways in which Bill S-11 attempted to clarify responsibility is
through the amendments to the directors’ liability regime. Also, the scope of directors’
duties have been clarified by specifying that directors have the power to choose to
delegate the management of the corporation to officers or keep these powers for
themselves.19 However, the CBCA could do a better job of clarifying responsibility and
15

See Poonam Puri & Jeffrey Larsen, Corporate Governance and Securities Regulation post-Enron
(Toronto: Butterworths, forthcoming 2004).
16

Dickerson Report, supra note 13 at 3.
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thus allowing for greater certainty and predictability for corporate actors, particularly in
the context of fiduciary duties. CBCA
In respect of fiduciary duties, the standard that is articulated in the CBCA is very broad,
open-ended and vague. Questions and issues regarding fiduciary duties emerge within all
contexts of corporate decision-making, and historically, the judiciary has been assigned
the task of flushing out the obligations of directors and officers in various contexts:
defending a hostile takeover-bid, the taking of corporate opportunities and managerial
compensation.
The CBCA does provide relatively more guidance in the context of related party
transactions where section 120 sets out bright line disclosure and abstinence from voting
requirements. However, in all other contexts, the duties of directors and officers are
subsumed under the general duty of to act in the best interests of the corporation. The
body of case law that interprets this duty in various contexts is dense and complicated.
Additionally, it is inaccessible to corporate actors, thus limiting its usefulness in
providing guidance to directors seeking to understand their fiduciary duties, or to
shareholders and other stakeholders who may be considering the pursuit of a claim based
on a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties. The ambiguity and uncertainty imposes
significant costs on corporate actors.
As noted above, an important component of ensuring accountability of corporate
managers involves clearly articulating in advance the expectations we have of those who
we wish to hold accountable. The CBCA, regulations or policy statements should
expressly articulate the duties that are expected of directors in various contexts. The most
pressing need for this codification is in the context of directors’ duties during hostile
takeover bids.
These recommendations raise a larger issue of when it is appropriate to codify common
law principles into a statute. Put another way, what would be gained by codification of
the common law? In this context, codification will allow for concision, certainty and ease
of access in respect of areas of corporate law that are extremely important and frequently
litigated. Codification will clearly set out the principles that the judiciary has articulated
over the years and resolve any inconsistencies.
A related issue that arises in this context is whether the law should be codified in the
CBCA, the regulations or by way of a policy directive issued by the Director.
Codification within the Act has the greatest actual and symbolic force of law. However,
given limited parliamentary time, codification in the Act would make it difficult to make
amendments in response to changed circumstances, whereas policy directives, followed
by regulations would be easier to amend.
Clearly, the remedial actions provided for under the CBCA act as mechanisms to ensure
accountability of corporate managers and directors. These remedies are also designed to
19
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protect shareholders and other vulnerable parties, and are therefore, discussed in the
following section.

C. Protecting Shareholders and Other Vulnerable Parties
The CBCA protects shareholders through the availability of shareholder remedies such as
the derivative suit, the oppression action, and the appraisal remedy. Shareholders are also
afforded protection by having to approve by a super-majority vote any fundamental
changes to the corporation, and access to other rights including the right to information.
The CBCA also protects the interests of third parties dealing with a corporation yet to be
formed by allocating risk and personal responsibility to the promoter of the corporation
prior to the existence of the corporation. The Bill S-11 amendments clarified the
confusion that had been created by certain recent judicial decisions. 20 The CBCA also
protects the interests of third parties dealing with the corporation through the indoor
management rule. The CBCA specifically protects the interests of creditors by requiring
in section 42 that a corporation be solvent when declaring or paying dividends. One of
the few instances where the CBCA protects employees is by imposing personal liability
on corporate directors for six months wages under section 119 of the CBCA. Creditors
and other stakeholders may also qualify as complainants under the oppression remedy to
sue the corporation and/or directors and officers.
Oppression Remedy
Mandatory or Default: The oppression remedy protects the reasonable expectations of
vulnerable parties. Since it is difficult to believe that corporate actors would knowingly
contract out in a wholesale manner of their reasonable expectations, and given the drastic
ramifications of doing so, this remedy should be mandatory in the closely-held
corporation and corporate actors should not be able to opt out of it. In the context of
closely-held companies, parties should be allowed to define the parameters of their
reasonable expectations by clearly articulating their relationship and arrangements in a
shareholders agreement, which effectively narrows the scope of any potential oppression
claim.
Type of Corporation: The intention of the Dickerson Committee was that the oppression
remedy would be of most use to minority shareholders of closely-held corporation.21
However, that intention is not reflected in the wording of the oppression remedy
provisions, which do not actually exclude the oppression action from being instituted in
relation to widely-held corporations. As a result, the default rule in the CBCA is that the
oppression remedy is available in relation to both public and private corporations.
20

See Poonam Puri, “The Hope of Certainty in the Law on Pre-Incorporation Contracts” (2001) 80:3 Can.
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A study that I co-authored with Professor Ben-Ishai indicates that 92% of oppression
cases adjudicated by Canadian courts in our sample period were in relation to private
closely-held corporations while only 8% were for public widely-held companies.22 The
success rate of an oppression claim was much lower in the case of public companies (2
out of 6 cases for a total of 33 %) compared to 54 % for private companies. The two most
recent public company cases involved defeated hostile takeover bidders acting as
complainants.23 In both cases, claims were made which at their core were derivative in
nature, and both cases were unsuccessful in making the case for oppression.
In the public company context, the oppression remedy does not assist in protecting
shareholders; economic efficiency would be better enhanced by the conservation of
judicial and private resources by institution of a default rule that the oppression remedy is
not available in public corporations (or not available without leave.)
Substantive Standard: The broad wording found in the CBCA oppression remedy
constitutes the broadest of the Canadian corporate law remedies. The open-ended
wording of the statutory oppression remedy has meant that the task of defining the ambit
of the remedy has been left to the Canadian judiciary. In the last 25 years that the
oppression remedy has been in existence, the courts have articulated a number of factors
that are indicative of oppression.24 It would serve the policy goals of good corporate law
by allowing for certainty, predictability and ease of access to codify these factors into the
CBCA, the regulations or a Director’s policy directive.
The Definition of Complainant: The wording of Section 238 of the CBCA suggests that
the oppression remedy is not simply a shareholder remedy, but rather, that it is available
to a broader class of applicants including directors and officers, and on a discretionary
basis to employees and creditors, among others.
22

Poonam Puri & Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Oppression Remedy Cases Judicially Considered: 1995-2001 (2003
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See supra note 5; See also CW Shareholdings v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.
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Puri & Ben-Ishai (2003), supra note 22, observed that the successful applications in their sample were
variations of a limited number of themes or conduct that mirror the list provided by Justice Austin in Arthur
v. Signum Communications Ltd. (1991), 25 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1206 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 74, varied on other
grounds (1992), 16 C.P.C. (3d) 38 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff’d (1993), 42 A.C.W.S. (3d) 332 (Ont. Div. Ct.) as
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a. lack of valid corporate purpose for the transaction;
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to simulate an arms’ length transaction;
c. lack of good faith on the part of the directors of the corporation;
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e. lack of adequate and appropriate disclosure of material information to minority shareholders;
and
f. a plan to eliminate a minority shareholder.
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The issue of whether non-shareholder corporate stakeholders are proper complainants to
bring an oppression application has come to the forefront of Canadian corporate law,
particularly in the context of creditors rights.25
The Puri and Ben-Ishai empirical study found that shareholders constituted the largest
class of complainants accounting for 80% of all complainants (with a 53% success rate).
Of the complainants who were shareholders, minority shareholders constituted 67% of
shareholder complainants.
Free-standing employees had no success in qualifying as complainants under the
discretionary category under Section 238 of the CBCA. However, when employees were
also shareholders, they were automatically entitled to status and we saw their
representation rise to 13% of all cases, (albeit with only a 2% success rate), following
shareholders as the largest complainant group.26 The low success rate may be explained
by the fact that unlike creditors the judiciary has not found other remedial options
available to employees to be problematic, and accordingly limited the application of the
remedy based on those other remedial options available to employees.
Creditors accounted for only 8% of all complainants, however, with a success rate of
83%. This result can be explained in part by the judiciary taking the view that an
oppression action is more appropriate than an action based on breach of fiduciary duty
and in part by a growing acceptance by the judiciary of a stakeholder theory of corporate
law, at least in respect of creditors. Unlike the employee complainant, the judiciary has
likely taken the view that creditor applications are necessary as there are no other legal
routes readily available to such aggrieved parties.
In the “other” category of complainants we saw Canadian courts granting complainant
status to lessors, licensors, a trustee in bankruptcy, and a widow of a former shareholder
in 9 cases (13%) with an overall success rate of 56%.
As the stakeholder and team production models of corporate law suggest, there are good
reasons to hold corporations and management to a certain standard of behaviour in
dealing with the interests of non-shareholders, but perhaps it is not the same standard as
shareholders. It would further the goals of good corporate law to more clearly articulate
which stakeholders should have access to the oppression remedy and under what
circumstances and standards.
25

For example, bondholders of Canadian corporations are becoming more vigilant in asserting their rights
in the background of a number of high profile reorganizations of telecommunication companies, such as
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This result likely reflects the judiciary’s view that shareholders in a closely-held corporation have a
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Derivative Claims as Oppression Actions: The issue of whether the oppression action
should be limited to personal actions has been the subject of much current academic
debate. Commentators have grappled with the issue of whether the oppression remedy
should embrace actions of a derivative character in addition to those of a purely personal
character.27
As Professor Jeffrey MacIntosh has written, this author too believes that statutory
amendments are warranted to deal with certain supportable and unsupportable differences
in procedure, costs, remedies and the substantive standard of liability as between
derivative actions and oppression actions.28 It is also the view of this author that the
oppression remedy as it currently stands should not apply to derivative claims.29
Other scholars such as Professors Iaccobucci and Davis suggest that because the absence
of the leave requirement under the oppression action is matched with the absence of the
entitlement to indemnification for costs and because the danger of a flood of suits is
unlikely to materialize in practise, there are really no good reasons for amending the
current oppression remedy or not allowing the oppression remedy to embrace derivative
wrongs.30
The Puri and Ben-Ishai’s empirical results indicate that out of 71 cases, only 16 cases
dealt with derivative wrongs, and only one case explicitly discussed the issue of an
oppression action brought for a derivative wrong. Out of the 16 cases dealing with
derivative wrongs, 9 cases could be classified as both derivative and personal in nature.
It would appear that the judiciary has avoided a reasoned discussion of the topic and for
the most part allows derivative claims to be brought by litigants as oppression claims.
The CBCA should be amended so that it expressly defines derivative suits and excludes
them from being pursued under the oppression action, at least in the context of public
companies, where even the threat of an oppression claim can have significant nuisance
value.
Appraisal/Right to Dissent
Dissent and appraisal protect shareholder interests in ways that other remedies do not. A
fundamental change that has been carefully considered by all involved, who have taken
into account the interests of those opposing the change but ultimately judged it to be in

27

The oppression remedy provision under the CBCA does not explicitly include claims made on behalf of
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the best interests of the corporation, may not trigger the oppression remedy, but will
trigger dissent and appraisal.
In a closely-held corporation, there may be no other way for the dissenting shareholder to
recoup his/her investment. Without a market in the stock it may not be sold off at fair
value. Therefore, for private corporations, the dissent right should not only be available,
but also should be mandatory.
A shareholder in a public corporation can sell his/her shares in the market in the face of a
fundamental change to the corporation that he/she is not agreeable to. However, a key
problem with leaving it to the market is that the announcement of the fundamental change
may cause the share price to drop and the dissenting shareholder would not be able to sell
before this occurs. While the case for the appraisal remedy is not as strong as in the
closely-held corporations, dissent and appraisal should nonetheless be mandatory for
public corporations. As the Dickerson Report alluded to, the existence of the appraisal
remedy also imposes a certain discipline on management to only bring forth valueenhancing fundamental changes because if enough shareholders dissent, the corporation’s
cash resources would be tied up to the point where the corporation would not be able to
proceed with the transaction.
The Derivative Action
The Right to Bring a Derivative Action Should be Mandatory: Provided that the
oppression action cannot be used to remedy a wrong which is derivative in nature, there
will be situations in which the only way to recover is through the derivative action.
Therefore, contracting out of the right to such a remedy should not be permitted. In
situations where corporate management is engaged in self-dealing or taking of corporate
opportunities, for example, one cannot expect them to commence a suit against
themselves on behalf of the corporation. As a result, corporate actors should not be
allowed to opt out of the derivative suit.
Conditions Precedent: No further clarification is needed to the conditions precedent. The
recent change to 14 days in the notice requirement allows for greater certainty and
predictability. As for “good faith” and “in the interests of the corporation” requirements,
these are factual matters that are better left to the judiciary and common law than to be
defined within the CBCA.
It may be worthwhile to mention the judgment of a litigation committee in section 239. A
phrase such as “the findings of an independent litigation committee may be considered by
the court but shall not be decisive in determining whether an action would be in the best
interests of the corporation,” not unlike the provision in section 242 in respect of
shareholder ratification would be appropriate.
Contracting Out of Liability for Breaches of Fiduciary Duty: Some U.S. jurisdictions
allow for contracting out of personal liability of directors and officers of the corporation.
Delaware’s Title 8 s. 102(b)(7) enables shareholders to adopt a charter provision that

23

Hallmarks of Good Corporate Law
Professor Poonam Puri

“opts out” from the personal liability of directors to the corporation or to stockholders for
breach of fiduciary duty. As a related matter, the American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project allows a ceiling on financial liability of officers and directors for
negligence.
The contracting out provision likely reflects a greater acceptance of the contractarianism
view of the corporation and the U.S. reality of competition for corporate charters. It is
the view of this author, that based on a proper balancing of the policy goals of corporate
law and the evolution and role of corporate law in Canada, shareholders ought not be
allowed to contract out, in a wholesale manner, of the right to sue for breaches of
fiduciary duty under the CBCA.
Pre-emptive Rights
Section 28 of the CBCA enables a corporation’s articles to provide for a pre-emptive
right, but the default provision is that no pre-emptive rights exist. Pre-emptive rights can
protect shareholders from dilution, but can also reduce flexibility in making financing
decisions. Even in the absence of pre-emptive rights, the oppression remedy provides
some measure of protection against dilution, even in their absence. The question is
whether the default should be set to have them or not. The Dickerson Report dealt with
this issue and was in favour of having default pre-emptive rights. Section 66(1) of the
BCBCA requires pre-emptive rights unless the articles provide otherwise, but provide an
exception for public corporations, for which a pre-emptive right would be needlessly
complicated. CBCA s. 28 should not be altered because there seems to be little benefit in
making a pre-emptive right the default. The authors of the Dickerson Report believed that
there were insufficient measures in place to protect shareholders from dilution, but they
seem to have underestimated how broad the oppression remedy would become. Balanced
with the reduction in flexibility that pre-emptive rights create, it seems that these rights
should only be available where shareholders specifically turn their minds to the issue, or
where a court determines that such rights were part of the shareholders’ reasonable
expectations.
The Proxy System
A general problem with the proxy system is that it may chill informal communications
between shareholders by creating fear that the communications will be construed as a
proxy solicitation. This problem has, to a certain extent, been dealt with in the last round
of CBCA reforms, as a number of specific exceptions to the requirement to distribute a
dissident proxy circular were created. The amendments have had a positive effect on the
market in respect of management accountability and transparency. For example, Ontario
Teachers Pension Plan now discloses on its website how it intends to vote its proxies at
upcoming annual general meetings, allowing for meaningful reflection by other
shareholders on how they should vote their proxies.31
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Notwithstanding the relaxation of proxy rules in Bill S-11, the stricter rules are still in
effect under securities law statutes but they are not being enforced. This situation
presents a problem of consistency and clarity for shareholders. On the one hand,
shareholders are being told by the CBCA that certain informal communications will not
trigger the proxy solicitation requirements. On the other hand, they are being told by
securities laws that the definition of proxy solicitation is extremely broad and does not
contain the exemptions that are currently in the CBCA. Layered on top of this conflicting
regulation is the reality that securities regulators are not currently enforcing the relevant
provisions. Where does this situation leave investors? The costs of compliance with
multiple and conflicting regulation is ultimately borne by investors and the general
public. When investors are unable to distinguish between securities laws on the books
and securities laws in practice or action, communications among shareholders will be at a
level that is less than optimal, which in turn will negatively affect management
accountability. Securities laws that are not being enforced on a rational basis (as opposed
to a lack of resources) should be repealed. This issue is worthy of additional detailed
analysis, but as a general matter, greater co-ordination between federal and provincial
corporate law regulators and provincial securities law regulators ought to be a priority for
both levels of government.
Shareholder Proposals
The rules for shareholder proposals seem to be based on fear of the activist shareholder.
In large corporations shareholder participation provides a necessary level of scrutiny.
However, participation is naturally discouraged by the fact that it is so much easier to
vote with your feet. It seems counterproductive to make it difficult for those who
actually do want to participate to do so.
One recommendation for reform that would substantially further the goals of shareholder
protection and management accountability is that management should have to justify its
refusal to circulate a proposal to an appropriate regulatory authority. In the U.S.,
management refusal is subject to a formal review by the SEC. In Canada, the shareholder
must apply to the court before management’s decision receives any sort of review. This
makes it less likely that a worthy proposal, having been refused, will be saved and
circulated.
While the SEC conducts the review in the U.S., since it is the body that promulgates rules
on shareholder proposals, provincial securities regulators in Canada would not have the
authority to review proposals that are a part of corporate law statutes. Implementing this
recommendation would require review by the Director of the CBCA, which would
involve a more active role than is currently taken.
There is also a need for a mechanism that ensures that management has followed-up
appropriately on proposals that were approved by shareholders at an annual general
meeting. Other than shareholder proposals that create, repeal or add bylaws which do not
require any further action by management, most other shareholder proposal are advisory
only and require management to implement them before they can take effect.
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At a minimum, management should be required to report in the following year’s proxy
materials whether the shareholder proposals that were approved in the previous year were
implemented. A reasoned justification should be provided if no follow-up action was
taken. Alternatively, management’s fails to implement a proposal approved by a majority
of the shareholders could trigger a shareholder’s right to nominate directors to the board.
The SEC is currently seeking comments on this mechanism in relation to its proposed
rule to allow shareholders direct proxy access to nominate directors.32
Shareholder Discussion
Section 137(1)(b) implies that the right of discussion is only present at annual meetings.
There is no valid reason not to allow discussion at special meetings, therefore, the
wording should be changed to specifically allow a right of discussion at special meetings.
Requisitioning of Meetings
The rules on requisitioning meetings should make it clear that the right under section
143(4) for a shareholder to call a meeting when the directors refuse to do so is dependant
on the directors not having a justification under 143(3) to not call the meeting. As the
section is currently worded, the possibility exists for the meeting to be justifiably not
called by the directors (and therefore, it should not be called at all) and still be called by a
shareholder.
Access to Corporate Records
The rules for access to corporate records should be mandatory. Without access to
information shareholders simply are not adequately protected, not knowing whether the
directors and officers are doing a good job, or whether or not they should continue their
investment.
Right to Appoint an Auditor
The rules surrounding the auditor and audit committee fall into the category of “adequate
information”. These rules are a necessary part of financial disclosure, and financial
disclosure is necessary to protect investors and promote confidence in the market.
Therefore, these rules must be mandatory, at least for publicly traded corporations. In the
private, closely-held corporation, shareholders should have the right to opt out of an audit
of the financial statements. This issue is discussed in detail below.
D. Responding to the Needs of Smaller Closely-Held Businesses
Most Canadian businesses are micro, small or medium sized enterprises. As early as the
Dickerson Report, there has been an express policy of ensuring the CBCA is responsive
32
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to the needs of the different types of corporations that exist in Canada. For instance, the
Dickerson Report led to the legitimization of the unanimous shareholder agreement in the
CBCA, “improv[ing] the position of those who may wish to have a truly ‘private’
corporation.”33
The CBCA recognizes that the requirement to prepare audited financial statements may
be cost-prohibitive for smaller private businesses. Accordingly non-distributing
corporations may dispense with the requirement to appoint an auditor (section 163) with
the unanimous consent of all the shareholders, including those otherwise not entitled to
vote. The rules on shareholder meetings also accommodate the needs and realities of
small businesses by allowing for all shareholders to unanimously sign resolution in lieu
of an actual meeting. In Bill S-11, the unanimous shareholder provisions of the CBCA
were clarified to reflect current practices, revealing a continued concern for ensuring that
the CBCA can be effectively utilized by closely-held corporations.
This policy goal reflects an important priority area, and further clarification of CBCA
provisions in respect of the unanimous shareholders agreement should be made. While
the CBCA defines a unanimous shareholders agreement as an agreement that restricts in
whole or in part the powers of the directors to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, the ABCA’s34 definition of unanimous shareholders agreement is not
dependent on transferring board powers to the shareholders. Consideration ought to be
given to expanding the scope of the definition of a unanimous shareholders agreement to
include agreements that do not necessarily transfer board powers to the shareholders.
Given that the shareholders assume the liabilities of directors under a unanimous
shareholders agreement, clarification also ought to be provided on whether the
shareholders have director-like fiduciary duties when voting their shares. As well, further
study ought to be conducted on whether the CBCA default provisions meet the needs of
closely-held businesses.
E. Attracting Business to the Jurisdiction by Inspiring Confidence and
Supporting Competitiveness, Innovation and Growth
It is difficult for a corporate law enabling statute to actively attract business to Canada
and to actively make Canadian business more competitive. These policy goals are better
achieved by other regulatory frameworks, instruments and tools. However, policymakers
can ensure that the CBCA does not create unnecessary rules or requirements that make
these policy goals more difficult to achieve.
The Canadian residency requirement represents one such obstacle and should be
eliminated. The stated rationale for the requirement is that it fosters Canadian
participation in corporate decision-making, fosters compliance with and enforcement of
legal obligations, promotes Canadian participation in the decision-making of
33
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multinational enterprises, and help foreign firms to understand the economic, political
and social environment of Canada.35 However, these rationales ought to be re-evaluated
for their relevance in light of the increasingly globalized economy. In addition, one must
question whether there is one Canadian viewpoint, and whether Canadian residency
serves as a reliable proxy for Canadian viewpoints.
Reflecting Bill S-11’s main goal of improving ”the ability of Canadian corporations to
compete in the marketplace36 enhancing global competitiveness,37 the Canadian residency
requirement for directors was reduced from a majority of the board to 25%. However,
the reduction from 50% to 25% is difficult to rationalize. The residency requirement
should be abolished entirely from the CBCA. Industry specific residency requirements
should be maintained or introduced only for those business sectors for which the
government believes they are essential.

F. The Role of the Director
The CBCA contains several provisions that pertain to the responsibility of the Director
under the Act. The Director can engage in four sets of activities under the CBCA:






The Director can make an application to the court to, for example, have a meeting
ordered, to commence a derivative or oppression action, or to dissolve the
corporation.38
The Director can effect certain actions or directions without applying to the
court.39 These include directing the corporation to change its name (s.12(2)),
requiring the directors to restate the articles (s.180(1)).
The Director has certain (discretionary and non-discretionary powers) to issue
exemptions.40 These include exemptions for “distributing corporation” status,
exemptions for trust indenture, and exemption from the requirement for an audit
committee.
The Director has certain powers (discretionary and non-discretionary) to issue
certificates.41

These responsibilities have been further defined, and in some cases circumscribed, by the
courts and the Director him/herself. In Sparling et al v. Royal Trustco Ltd. et al.42, the
35

Supra note 10 at 3-4.

36

Supra note 10.
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Ibid. at 2.
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Table 2, Appendix A.
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Table 3, Appendix A.

41

Table 4, Appendix A.
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Director commenced an oppression action alleging that the company and its directors
were in breach of the requirements of the CBCA by failing to disclose certain information
in a director’s circulate in response to a takeover bid and that shareholders would be
mislead as a result. The court held that the Director was entitled to commence an action
on behalf of the shareholders and provided the following rationale:43
The Canada Business Corporations Act provides for the
appointment of a Director, who is given wide powers in corporate
affairs [… and that] it is therefore clear that the Director has broad
powers of investigation and intervention on behalf of the public in
corporate affairs. These broad powers are apparent in the
provisions pertaining to takeover bids and those referring to
oppressive and unfairly prejudicial acts affecting security holders
or creditors of the corporation.
Furthermore, Justice Cory explained that,
The Director, as public protector, should be able to bring an action
such as this to remedy the past wrong of non-disclosure. From a
practical point of view, it is impossible to conceive of a small
shareholder attempting to bring an action in a situation such as
presents itself in this case. The legal costs involved might well
outweigh his investment, yet he may have suffered what is to him a
very substantial loss. Where a statute provides a remedy, its scope
should not be unduly restricted.
The Director has also issued certain policy directives in the context of export continuance
transactions44 and arrangements under section 192 of the Act.45 For the most part,
however, the general consensus of stakeholders is that the Director of the CBCA
historically has taken a relatively passive role in the enforcement and interpretation of the
CBCA.
To effect some of the recommendations contained in this report, such as review of
shareholder proposals by the Director, codification of certain common law rules, greater
policy direction in respect of certain areas or corporate law, the Director’s office will
need to take a more pro-active role in administering the CBCA. This will, of course,

42

[1984] 45 O.R. (2d) 484, (QL) aff’d [1986] 2 S.C.R. 537 (QL).

43

Ibid.

44

Director of the Canada Business Corporations Act, 9.3 - Policy of the Director as to “Export”
Transactions Under the CBCA (Policy Statement) (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1999).
45

Director of the Canada Business Corporations Act, 15.1 - Policy of the Director Concerning
Arrangements Under section 192 of the CBCA (Policy Statement) (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1999).
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require greater resources in terms of budgeting as well as the hiring of additional
specialized staff.
However, this recommendation should not take away from the recommendation that
parliament should devote more parliamentary time and resources to the upkeep of the
CBCA. Historically, the CBCA has not received as much parliamentary time or attention
as other business law legislation, such as the Income Tax Act, the Competition Act or the
Copyright Act. The CBCA has only gone through one set of major changes since its
inception in 1975. There were also minor amendments in other years, but they were
primarily of a cosmetic nature.46
The Income Tax Act is a clear example of an act that receives a great deal of attention: the
act changes every year. While some aspect of the high rate of change of amendments can
be attributed to the government’s interest in closing up loopholes used by taxpayers and
their professional advisors as well as reversing judicial decisions, some aspect of the
frequency of amendments is certainly related to the high political priority that tax matters
receive.
Comparison of the CBCA to the Competition Act reveals similar, though less striking,
results. From 1935 to 1960, there were several changes to the Competition Act, (then
called the Combines Investigation Act.) In 1966, the federal government began a
legislative reform process that took 20 years to complete, with major changes in 1976 and
1986, when the Competition Act was enacted. Citing the rapidly changing global
economy, the Competition Act is amended constantly, on an incremental basis, rather
than waiting years to get major overhauls through the legislature. Significant
amendments were made in 1999, 2000, and 2002.47
A more enabling piece of legislation, more akin to the CBCA than the other two
legislative frameworks above, is the Copyright Act. Enacted in 1924, modernization did
not begin until 1988. Since then, there have been significant changes in 1989, 1993,
1994, and 1996. Some of these (1989, 1994, and 1996) were a result of trade agreements,
extending copyright protection. The other was an attempt to keep up with development
of different forms of transmitting. The pace of change (i.e. frequency of amendments) to
the Copyright Act has not been as rapid as to the other two mentioned, but is still higher
than that of the CBCA. As well, there is another round of reforms under way.
Based on a comparison with the above-noted statutes, the rate of change of the CBCA has
been relatively slow and infrequent. While this may owe in part to the CBCA’s role as
providing an enabling framework, a commitment from the government to ensure
parliamentary time for frequent amendments to the CBCA is critical to maintaining its
46

Many of these changes were in relation to amendments to other legislation, and had to do with the
definitions in section 2 of the CBCA. For example, in 2002, with the amendments to the Yukon Act, the
definition of "court" in s. 2(1) changed to reflect the change in the name of the Yukon court.
47

See Suzanne Legault and Don Mercer, “Legislative Reform of the Competition Act", on the Competition
Bureau website.
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effectiveness. The review clause contained in Bill S-11 which requires a committee of
the Senate and/or House of Commons to regularly review the provisions and operations
of the CBCA is laudable and should go some way in ensuring that sufficient
parliamentary attention is devoted to the CBCA in the future.48

48

Section 136 of Bill S-11 provides that:
A committee of the Senate, of the House of Commons or of both Houses of Parliament that is designated or
established for the purpose shall, within five years after the coming into force of this section, and within
every ten years thereafter, undertake a review of the provisions and operations of the Canada Business
Corporations Act, and shall, within a reasonable period thereafter, cause to be laid before each House of
Parliament a report theron.
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4. Conclusion
An evaluation of the CBCA reveals that it is effective in meeting and balancing the six
policy goals and objectives of good corporate law set out in this report. The most recent
round of amendments to the CBCA contained in Bill S-11 were instrumental in furthering
the goals of protecting shareholders, inspiring confidence, innovation and growth, and
responding to the needs of smaller closely-held businesses. There remains further room
for improvement, however.


In the context of enhancing economic efficiency, the government’s stated goal of
minimizing duplication with provincial securities regulation should be revisited.
A more logical goal for the CBCA should be to determine which aspects of
business law regulation are most appropriately contained in a corporate law
statute and which aspects are better suited to be left to securities regulators.



In the context of ensuring accountability of corporate managers, a sub-goal of this
policy objective is to clearly articulate the responsibilities and duties of those we
wish to hold accountable. As such, directors’ duties in the context of take-over
bids should be codified into the CBCA, the regulations or policy directives issued
by the Director.



In the context of protecting shareholders and other vulnerable parties, it should be
made clear that the oppression remedy cannot be used to pursue claims that are
derivative in nature. In addition, in respect of non-shareholders, additional
guidance should be provided on who is a proper person to be a complainant to
seek relief under the oppression remedy.



In the context of being responsive to the needs of small closely-held corporations,
the definition of unanimous shareholders agreement should be broadened so that
it recognizes shareholders agreements that do not transfer board duties to the
shareholders.
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Appendix A - Table 1: Applications Director Can Make to the Court
CBCA ss.
144(1)

154(1)

167(1)

212(1)(b)

229

Subject of Rule
Meeting called by court
(Director can apply to the court to
order a meeting of shareholders)
Restraining order (Director can
apply to the court where a proxy
contains an untrue statement of a
material fact)
Court appointed auditor

Who Can Apply?
a director, shareholder who is entitled
to vote at a meeting of shareholders,
or the Director
an interested person, or the Director

Conditions
none

Exceptions
None

none

None

shareholder or the Director

“If a corporation does
not have an auditor,”
and only “until an
auditor is appointed by
the shareholders”

Dissolution by Director
(by application to court for an
order)
Investigation (“application for an
order directing an investigation to
be made of the corporation and
any of its affiliated corporations”)

Director

none

“does not
apply if the
shareholders
have resolved
under s.163
not to appoint
an auditor”
None

security holder or the Director

“may apply, ex parte or
on such notice as the
court may require”

s. 238 “ complainant”
includes a registered or beneficial
security holder, present or former
director or officer of corp., the
Director, any other “proper person”
(discretion of court)
same as “complainant” for derivative
actions
the Director

239

Commencing a derivative action

241

Application to court re oppression

244

Application for directions

265.1 (4)

Cancellation of articles by
Director: application to court

the Director or an “interested person”

265(4)

Correction of documents:
Application to court

the Director, the corporation, or “any
interested person who wishes a
correction”

Where a security holder
makes such an
application, they must
give reasonable notice
to the Director, who is
entitled to appear and be
heard in person or by
counsel.
See “conditions
precedent” in s.239(2)

None

None

none

None

“may apply to a court
for direction in respect
of any matter
concerning the
Director’s duties under
this Act”
if in any of their views,
the cancellation would
prejudice shareholders
or creditors of the
corporation
if in any of their views,
a correction would
prejudice shareholders
or creditors of the
corporation

None

None
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Appendix A - Table 2: Actions Director Can Effect Without Applying to the Court
CBCA ss.
12(2)

Subject of Rule
Directing change of name

180(1)

Restated articles

188(1)

Continuance

212(1)(a)

Dissolution by Director

235(1)

Information respecting ownership and control

237

Inquiries

264

Alteration

265(1)

Corrections at the request of Director

265(3)

Corrections at the request of the corporation

265.1

Cancellation of articles by Director

Conditions
If the corporation’s name contravenes (inadvertently
or otherwise) section 12(1), the Director may direct
the corporation to change its name.
the directors “shall when reasonably so directed by
the Director, restate the articles of incorporation.”
In addition to obtaining shareholder approval, the
corporation must “establish to the satisfaction of the
Director that its proposed continuance in the other
jurisdiction will not adversely affect creditors or
shareholder of the corporation.”
“if the corporation”…see (i) through (iv) – basically
the corp. is no longer carrying on business.
Also, “despite anything in this section, the Director
may dissolve a corporation…if the required fee for
the issuance of a certificate of incorporation has not
been paid” 212(3.1).
“If the Director is satisfied that, for the purposes of
Part XI, XIII or XVII, or for the purposes of
enforcing any regulation…, there is reason to
inquire into the ownership or control of a security of
a corporation…”
“The Director may make inquiries of any person
relating to compliance with this Act” (broad
independent investigative powers, in addition to the
right to apply to court for an Investigation)
“the Director may alter a notice or document, other
than an affidavit or statutory declaration, if
authorized by the person who sent the document or
by that person’s representative.”
if there is an error in a document, the directors or
shareholders of the corporation “shall, on the
request of the Director,” pass the necessary
resolutions, send the documents to the Director and
take “such other steps as the Director may
reasonably require so that the Director may correct
the document.”
the Director may “accept a correction” if it is
approved by the directors (unless it is an obvious
error or was made by the Director) and, the Director
is satisfied that the correction wouldn’t prejudice
any shareholders, and the cancellation reflects the
original intention of the corporation or the
incorporators”
“in the prescribed circumstance, the Director may,
at the request of a corporation or of any other
interested person cancel the articles…” if the
cancellation is approved by the directors, and it
wouldn’t prejudice any shareholders, and the
cancellation reflects the original intention of the
corporation or the incorporators” 265.1(3).

35

Hallmarks of Good Corporate Law
Professor Poonam Puri

Appendix A - Table 3: Director’s Powers (Discretionary & non-Discretionary) to
Issue Exemptions
CBCA ss.
2(6) &(7)

Subject of Rule
Exemption for “distributing corporation”
status

Application Procedure
“on the application of a corporation”

10(2)

Exemption for s.10(1): Name of
Corporation
Exemption of trust indenture

this exemption may apply to a “body
corporate continued under this Act”

151(1)

Exemption (from sending a form of proxy
under 149, or soliciting proxies under
150)

“on the application of an interested
person”

156

Exemptions from including items in
financial statements &/or publication of
financial statements

“on application of the corporation”

171(2)

Exemption from Audit Committee

“on the application of the
corporation”

258.2

Exemption

“In the prescribed circumstance”

82(3)

Director’s Discretion
Director “may determine… if
the Director is satisfied that the
determination would not be
prejudicial to the public
interest”
Director “may exempt”
Director “may exempt,” if the
trust indenture is subject to
equivalent laws of any
province or country outside of
Canada
Director “may exempt the
person, on any terms that the
Director thinks fit…which
exemption may have
retrospective effect”
“The Director may…authorize”
omissions of items and
dispense with publication
obligations, “and the Director
may, if the Director reasonably
believes that the disclosure of
the information contained in
the statements would be
detrimental to the corporation,
permit any reasonable
conditions that the Director
thinks fit.”
“The Director may…authorize
the corp. to dispense with an
audit committee…, if satisfied
that the shareholders will not
be prejudiced,…on any
reasonable conditions that the
Director thinks fit”
“The Director may, on any
conditions that the Director
considers appropriate, exempt
from the application of any
provision of this Act requiring
notices or documents to be sent
to the Director any
notices…containing
information similar to that
contained in notices or
documents required to be made
public…”
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Appendix A - Table 4: Director’s Powers (Discretionary & non-Discretionary) to
Issue Certificates
CBCA
ss.
8(2)

Subject of Rule

Application Procedure

Director’s Discretion (Exceptions)

Certificate of
incorporation

Exception – failure to comply with the Act: “the Director may
refuse to issue the certificate…” in the event of non-compliance
with subsection 19(2) or subsection 106(1).

178

Certificate of
amendment of
articles
Certificate of
amalgamation

“on receipt of articles of
incorporation, the Director
shall issue a
certificate…”s.8(1)
“on receipt of articles of
amendment”
“on receipt of articles of
amalgamation”

“Director shall issue a certificate…” (No explicit discretion)
But, note that as per s.185(2), the articles of amalgamation must
have declarations from a director or officer that “establish” certain
key things “to the satisfaction of the Director”
“Director shall issue a certificate…” (No explicit discretion)
But, it seems that as per subsections (1) and (3), the Director does
have discretion over issuing the certificate

185(4)

187(4)

187(11)

191(5)

Certificate of
continuance
(import)

Where continued
reference to par
value shares
permissible
Certificate of
reorganization

Corporation may “apply to
the Director for a certificate”
187(1), and the articles of
continuance must be “in the
form that the Director fixes”
187(3).
“on receipt of articles of
continuance”
“on the application of a body
corporate”
“on receipt of articles of
reorganization”

192(7)

Certificate of
arrangement

“on receipt of articles of
arrangement”

209

Certificate of
revival

“any interested person may
apply to the Director” (see
def’n of “interested person in
202(6))

211(5)

211(11)

263.1

Certificate of
intent to dissolve
& certificate of
dissolution
Certificate of
revocation of
Intent to Dissolve

Certificate

“on receipt of articles of
revival”
“on receipt of statement of
intent to dissolve”
“on receipt of statement of
revocation of intent to
dissolve”

“Director shall issue a certificate…”(No explicit discretion)

“Where the Director determines…the Director may…permit the
body corporate to…”
“Director shall issue a certificate…” (No explicit discretion)
But, the corporation must already have obtained a court order
made under 191(1)
“Director shall issue a certificate…” (No explicit discretion)
But, section 192(3) provides that the applicant “shall give the
Director notice of the application and the Director is entitled to a
appear and be heard in person or by counsel” at the court hearing
“the Director shall issue a certificate…if (a) the body corporate
has fulfilled all conditions that the Director considers reasonable;
and (b) there is no valid reason for refusing to issue the
certificate.”

“Director shall issue a certificate…” (No explicit discretion),
because the corporation may only liquidate or dissolve with
shareholder approval (211(3)).
“at any time after the issue of a certificate of intent to dissolve and
before the issue of a certificate of dissolution, a certificate of
intent to dissolve may be revoked” (10) and the “Director shall
issue a certificate…” (No explicit discretion), because shareholder
approval of the revocation is necessary (211(3)).
Director may provide any person with a certificate.
Note: s.263.1(2) explicitly provides that, “for greater certainty, the
Director may refuse to issue a certificate described in paragraph
(1)(c) [certificate that a corporation exists as of a certain date] “if
the corporation is in default of sending required documents or
paying a required fee”.
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